

**Online Appendices for:
Economic Development and Democracy: An Electoral Connection**

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APPENDIX A: Data

Table A1: Variable Definitions

Democracy Indices

Polity2 (Polity IV). Measures the extent to which democratic or autocratic “authority patterns” are institutionalized in a given country. It takes into account how the executive is selected, the degree of checks on executive power, and the form of political competition (Marshall et al. 2014). *polity2*

UDS (Pemstein). A democracy index comprised of multiple indicators and aggregated through a Bayesian IRT measurement model (Pemstein et al. 2010). *uds_mean*

Political Rights (FH). An annual comparative assessment of political rights based on a 1 to 7 scale (Freedom House 2014). *fh_pr*

Civil Liberties (FH). An annual comparative assessment of civil liberties based on a 1 to 7 scale (Freedom House 2014). *fh_cl*

Liberal Component (V-Dem). The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (*v2xcl_rol*), judicial constraints on the executive (*v2x_jucon*), and legislative constraints on the executive (*v2xlg_legcon*). *v2x_liberal*

Participatory Component (V-Dem). The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (*v2x_cspart*), direct popular vote (*v2xdd_dd*), elected local government power (*v2xel_locelec*), and elected regional government power (*v2xel_regelec*). *v2x_partip*

Deliberative Component (V-Dem). The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels. The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (*v2dlreason*), common good justification (*v2dlcommon*), respect for counterarguments (*v2dlcountr*), range of consultation (*v2dlconslt*), and engaged society (*v2dlengage*). *v2xdl_delib*

Egalitarian Component (V-Dem). The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality. The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position (*v2pepwrses*), power distribution according to social group (*v2pepwrsoc*), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (*v2clsocgrp*), equal access to education (*v2peedueq*), equal access to health (*v2pehealth*), power distribution according to gender (*v2pepwrgen*), share of budget allocated to public/common goods (*v2dlencmps*), and the share of welfare programs that provide universal rather than means-tested benefits (*v2dlunivl*). *v2x_egal*

Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem). To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (*v2clrspect*), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (*v2cltrnslw*), access to

justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew). *v2xcl_rol*

Judicial Constraints (V-Dem). To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind). *v2x_jucon*

Legislative Constraints (V-Dem). To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvst), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart). *v2xlg_legcon*

Free Expression (V-Dem). To what extent does government respect press & media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree). *v2x_freexp*

Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem). To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange). *v2xme_altinf*

Free Association (V-Dem). To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg). *v2x_frasoc_thick*

Executive Selection (V-Dem). Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)? The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected (if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion directly elected for each house, with the weight defined by which house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive). Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state (c1=1, otherwise 0). Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government (c2=1, otherwise 0). Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state (d=1) or not (d=0). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected (e=1) or not (e=0). In the second step, the extent to which the legislature is elected (b) is also independently taken into account in order to penalize presidential systems with unelected legislatures, or legislatures with a large share of presidential appointees, for example. Define hosw as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government (v2exhoshog=1), hosw=1. If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal power, hosw=.5. Define the weight for the head of government as hogw=1-hosw. The formula then is: $v2x_eleccoff = hosw * [\max(a, b * c1)] + hogw * [\max(a * d, b * c1 * d, e, b * c2)]$, unless the head of state is directly elected (v2ex_elechos=1) and the chief executive (v2ex_hosw=1), in case of which: $v2x_eleccoff = (hosw * [\max(a, b * c1)] + hogw * [\max(a * d, b * c1 * d, e, b * c2)] + b) / 2$. *v2x_eleccoff*

Adult Suffrage (V-Dem). What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections? This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as of January 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of

independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence'), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and – in the case of very poor information – the conditions in similar countries or colonies. *v2x_suffr*

BMR (Boix et al.). Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage (Boix, Miller & Rosato, 2013). *e_mibmr*

Lexical (Skaaning et al.). A lexical index of electoral democracy based on six conditions and seven levels: (L0) no elections; (L1) no-party or one-party elections; (L2) multiparty elections for legislature; (L3) multiparty elections for legislature and executive; (L4) minimally competitive, multiparty elections for legislature and executive; (L5) minimally competitive, multiparty elections with full male or female suffrage for legislature and executive; and (L6) minimally competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage for legislature and executive (Skaaning et al. 2015). *lexical_scale*

Competitive Elections (Skaaning et al.). An index of electoral competition coded 1 in any situation where the chief executive offices and seats in the effective legislative body are filled by multi-party elections characterized by uncertain outcomes – meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to gain government power (Skaaning et al. 2015). *competitive_elections*

Electoral Contestation (V-Dem). An index of electoral contestation, which combines, through multiplication, measures of Freedom of Association (*v2x_frassoc_thick*), Clean Elections (*v2xel_frefair*), and Executive Selection (*v2x_accex*). *v2x_contest*

Clean Elections (V-Dem). To what extent are elections free and fair? Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB Autonomy (*v2elembaut*), EMB Capacity (*v2elembcap*), Election Voter Registry (*v2elrgstry*), Election Vote Buying (*v2elvtobuy*), Election Other Voting Irregularities (*v2elirreg*), Election Government Intimidation (*v2elintim*), Election Other Electoral Violence (*v2elpeace*), and Election Free and Fair (*v2elrfair*). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by *v2x_elecreg*). *v2xel_frefair*

Components of Clean Elections index

Government Intimidation (V-Dem). In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? Responses: (0) Yes: the repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet; (1) Yes, frequent: there was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period; (2) Yes, some: there was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated – harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents; (3) Restrained: there were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups; (4) None: there was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day. *v2x_elintim*

Other Violence (V-Dem). In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)? Responses: (0) No: there was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country; it resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees; (1) Not really: there were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country; a few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily; (2) Somewhat: there were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country; the number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small; (3) Almost: there were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured; (4) Peaceful: no election-related violence between civilians occurred. *v2x_elpeace*

Vote Buying (V-Dem). In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying? Responses: (0) Yes: there was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates; (1) Yes, some: there were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties; (2) Restricted: money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded; (3) Almost none: there was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country; in all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters; (4) None: there was no evidence of vote/turnout buying. *v2x_ehvtbuy*

Other Irregularities (V-Dem). In this national election, was there evidence of other *intentional* irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud? Responses: (0) Yes: there were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities; (1) Yes, some: there were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country; (2) Sporadic: there were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups; (3) Almost none: there were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups’ access to participation; (4) None: there was no evidence of intentional other irregularities; unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred. *v2x_elirreg*

Voter Registry (V-Dem). In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used? Responses: (0) No: there was no registry, or the registry was not used; (1) No: there was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation); (2) Uncertain: there was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes; (3) Yes, somewhat: the registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly; (4) Yes: the voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion. *v2x_ehrstry*

EMB Capacity (V-Dem). Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election? Responses: (0) No: there are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory; (1) Not really: deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country; (2) Ambiguous: there might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB; (3) Mostly: there are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread; (4) Yes: the EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election. *v2elembcap*

EMB Autonomy (V-Dem). Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections? Responses: (0) No: the EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other *de facto* ruling body; (1) Somewhat: the EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the *de facto* ruling body; (2) Ambiguous: the EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election; (3) Almost: the EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the *de facto* ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections; (4) Yes: the EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules. *v2elembaut*

Free & Fair (V-Dem). Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? Responses: (0) No, not at all: the elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the ‘will of the people’ (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority); (1) Not really: while the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority); (2) Ambiguous: there was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities; it is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not; (3) Yes, somewhat: there were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome; (4) Yes: there was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. *v2x_elfrfair*

Independent variables

GDPpc(ln). Gross domestic product per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm, missing data interpolated within a time-series. *Source:* Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014). *e_migppcln_ipo*

Corruption (V-Dem). Includes indicators of corruption in the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the public sector at-large, aggregated with Bayesian factor analysis and then constructed as a historical stock with a 10%

annual depreciation rate. *v2x_icorr*

Land Inequality. A measure of land inequality, which combines the urbanization rate (Vanhanen 2003) with the percentage of cultivated land area comprised by family farms (also Vanhanen 2003), according to the formula: $(100 - [\text{urbanization rate}] * (100 - [\text{family farms}]))$. *land_inequality*

Diffusion variables. Diffusion of a variable for country *X* measured as a sum of that variable for all countries except country *X*, weighted by the distance (in kilometers) between the capital of each country and that of country *X*. *[variable name]_geo*

Internal Conflict. Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1. *Sources:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001), compiled by V-Dem. *conflict_int*

External Conflict. Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1. *Sources:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001), compiled by V-Dem. *conflict_ext*

Natural Resources. Dependence on natural resources, measured by revenues from oil, gas, coal, and metals as a percentage of GDP (Miller 2015). *e_resdep2*

Urbanization. Urban population divided by total population. Data on urban population and total population from Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu); missing data within a time-series interpolated using a linear model. *urban_clio_ipo*

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	Max
DEMOCRACY INDICATORS					
Polity2 (Polity IV)	15,903	0.477	0.352	0	1
UDS (Pemstein)	9,057	0.471	0.222	0	1
Political Rights (FH)	6,936	0.504	0.368	0	1
Civil Liberties (FH)	6,936	0.510	0.319	0	1
Liberal Component (V-Dem)	17,492	0.485	0.265	0.014	0.980
Participatory Component (V-Dem)	17,597	0.314	0.197	0	0.916
Deliberative Component (V-Dem)	17,600	0.419	0.307	0.008	0.992
Egalitarian Component (V-Dem)	17,495	0.444	0.263	0.041	0.976
Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem)	17,600	0.495	0.306	0.001	0.997
Judicial Constraints (V-Dem)	17,434	0.513	0.290	0.004	0.992
Legislative Constraints (V-Dem)	14,301	0.474	0.307	0.018	0.987
Free Expression (V-Dem)	17,448	0.464	0.305	0.009	0.991
Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem)	17,519	0.447	0.321	0.014	0.984
Free Association (V-Dem)	17,457	0.439	0.326	0.018	0.960
Executive Selection (V-Dem)	17,586	0.519	0.490	0	1
Adult Suffrage (V-Dem)	17,314	0.648	0.435	0	1
BMR (Boix et al.)	15,739	0.317	0.465	0	1
Lexical (Skaaning et al.)	18,142	0.457	0.391	0	1
Competitive Elections (Skaaning)	18,142	0.347	0.476	0	1
Electoral Contestation (V-Dem)	17,345	0.223	0.318	0	0.941
Clean Elections (V-Dem)	17,495	0.344	0.354	0	0.994
Government Intimidation (V-Dem)	16,735	-0.015	1.164	-3.948	3.524
Other Violence (V-Dem)	16,735	0.163	1.004	-4.519	2.521
Vote Buying (V-Dem)	16,735	0.139	1.110	-2.973	3.648
Other Irregularities (V-Dem)	16,735	0.099	1.128	-2.955	3.136
Voter Registry (V-Dem)	16,732	0.111	1.087	-3.876	3.002
EMB Capacity (V-Dem)	17,489	-0.116	1.566	-3.057	3.705
EMB Autonomy (V-Dem)	17,437	-0.195	1.622	-2.843	3.894
Free & Fair (V-Dem)	16,735	0.005	1.212	-3.258	2.955
CAUSAL FACTORS					
GDPpc (ln)	17,932	7.510	1.011	5.315	10.667
Corruption index	17,386	0.444	0.267	0.009	0.969
Land Inequality	9,764	5,040.182	2,474.755	0	9,603
Internal Conflict	30,753	0.064	0.245	0	1
External Conflict	30,753	0.098	0.297	0	1
Natural Resources	13,541	3.560	9.714	0	100
Urbanization rate	39,879	0.234	0.233	0.002	1
Diffusion variables:					
Polity2 (Polity IV)	40,660	0.009	0.011	0	0.100
UDS (Pemstein)	12,730	0.017	0.011	0.002	0.075
Political Rights (FH)	8,335	0.021	0.014	0.004	0.109
Civil Liberties (FH)	8,335	0.021	0.014	0.005	0.108
Liberal Component (V-Dem)	22,180	0.018	0.012	0.002	0.084
Participatory Component (V-Dem)	22,180	0.012	0.008	0.002	0.069
Deliberative Component (V-Dem)	22,180	0.016	0.012	0.002	0.095
Egalitarian Component (V-Dem)	22,180	0.017	0.012	0.001	0.072
Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem)	22,180	0.019	0.013	0.003	0.096
Judicial Constraints (V-Dem)	22,180	0.019	0.011	0.004	0.092
Legislative Constraints (V-Dem)	22,180	0.015	0.012	0.002	0.098
Free Expression (V-Dem)	22,180	0.018	0.012	0.003	0.091
Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem)	22,180	0.017	0.012	0.003	0.105
Free Association (V-Dem)	22,180	0.017	0.013	0.003	0.097
Executive Selection (V-Dem)	22,180	0.020	0.017	0.002	0.136
Adult Suffrage (V-Dem)	22,180	0.024	0.021	0.001	0.139
BMR (Boix et al.)	39,472	0.007	0.017	0	0.311
Lexical (Skaaning et al.)	40,660	0.011	0.022	0	0.315
Competitive Elections (Skaaning)	40,630	0.009	0.020	0	0.313

Electoral Contestation (V-Dem)	21,850	0.008	0.008	0.000	0.053
Clean Elections (V-Dem)	21,850	0.012	0.010	0.000	0.065

Democracy indices are normalized to 0-1, where 1=most democratic.

APPENDIX B: Robustness Tests

Table B1: Liberal Component (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS	
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
GDPpc (ln)	0.000 (0.002)	0.067*** (0.022)	0.046** (0.022)	0.001 (0.004)	0.103*** (0.029)			0.012 (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)	0.002 (0.002)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.073** (0.033)				
Lagged Y	0.961*** (0.004)			0.952*** (0.006)			0.756*** (0.022)	0.883*** (0.034)	0.901*** (0.013)	
Trend			0.001*** (0.000)							
Corruption				-0.011 (0.008)	-0.519*** (0.130)					
Land Inequality				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)					
Diffusion				0.042 (0.247)	4.972 (3.099)					
Internal Conflict				0.001 (0.003)	-0.019 (0.015)					
External Conflict				-0.000 (0.003)	-0.032* (0.017)					
Natural Resources				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)					
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181	
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116	
<i>Obs</i>	11700	11795	11795	6800	6800	11253	2295	2295	18860	
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.939	0.254	0.156	0.918	0.323	0.277	0.667		0.951	

Outcome: Liberal Component index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B2: Participatory Component (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Y>0	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GDPpc	0.001	0.016	0.004	0.002	0.052**		0.001	0.004	0.006	0.000
(ln)	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.025)		(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)
GDPpc						0.034				
(ln) L20						(0.024)				
Lagged Y	0.954***			0.948***			0.954***	0.760***	0.891***	0.883***
	(0.004)			(0.006)			(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.015)
Trend			0.002***							
			(0.000)							
Corruption				-0.009	-0.263***					
				(0.006)	(0.088)					
Land				-0.000**	-0.000***					
Inequality				(0.000)	(0.000)					
Diffusion				-0.035	1.616					
				(0.279)	(2.671)					
Internal				0.003	0.008					
Conflict				(0.002)	(0.011)					
External				-0.001	-0.020*					
Conflict				(0.002)	(0.011)					
Natural				0.000	-0.000					
Resources				(0.000)	(0.001)					
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	111	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11734	11829	11829	6800	6800	11277	11671	2316	2316	18860
R2 (<i>within</i>)	0.944	0.394	0.318	0.923	0.364	0.402	0.944	0.743		0.949

Outcome: Participatory Component index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), Y>0 (scores for Participatory Component that surpass 0), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B3: Deliberative Component (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS	
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
GDPpc (ln)	0.001 (0.002)	0.056** (0.025)	0.029 (0.026)	0.006 (0.004)	0.125*** (0.036)			0.012 (0.012)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.002)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.048 (0.037)				
Lagged Y	0.943*** (0.004)			0.929*** (0.007)			0.668*** (0.022)	0.768*** (0.041)	0.888*** (0.013)	
Trend			0.004*** (0.001)							
Corruption				-0.017* (0.009)	-0.569*** (0.145)					
Land Inequality				-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)					
Diffusion				0.066 (0.338)	6.366** (2.695)					
Internal Conflict				0.003 (0.004)	-0.014 (0.019)					
External Conflict				-0.000 (0.004)	-0.040* (0.021)					
Natural Resources				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)					
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181	
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116	
<i>Obs</i>	11735	11830	11830	6800	6800	11277	2317	2317	18860	
R2 (<i>within</i>)	0.933	0.395	0.311	0.904	0.388	0.396	0.669		0.936	

Outcome: Deliberative Component index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B4: Egalitarian Component (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.018 (0.016)	0.024* (0.014)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.007 (0.019)		0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)	0.000 (0.001)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.017 (0.020)			
Lagged Y	0.959*** (0.004)			0.956*** (0.005)			0.778*** (0.016)	0.963*** (0.025)	0.859*** (0.019)
Trend			0.004*** (0.000)						
Corruption				-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.465*** (0.064)				
Land Inequality				-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)				
Diffusion				-0.197 (0.131)	1.937 (1.849)				
Internal Conflict				0.005*** (0.002)	0.006 (0.009)				
External Conflict				-0.000 (0.002)	-0.011 (0.011)				
Natural Resources				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)				
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11701	11796	11796	6800	6800	11254	2296	2296	18860
R2 (<i>within</i>)	0.971	0.625	0.609	0.967	0.711	0.635	0.851		0.961

Outcome: Egalitarian Component index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B5: Individual Liberty/Rule of Law (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.061** (0.025)	0.040 (0.026)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.111*** (0.030)		0.002 (0.009)	0.017* (0.010)	0.000 (0.002)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.052 (0.036)			
Lagged Y	0.958*** (0.004)			0.948*** (0.006)			0.738*** (0.022)	0.860*** (0.042)	0.904*** (0.013)
Trend			0.002*** (0.001)						
Corruption				-0.014 (0.009)	-0.513*** (0.142)				
Land Inequality				0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)				
Diffusion				0.153 (0.311)	6.026* (3.354)				
Internal Conflict				0.002 (0.004)	-0.062*** (0.016)				
External Conflict				-0.001 (0.003)	-0.036** (0.016)				
Natural Resources				0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)				
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11735	11830	11830	6800	6800	11277	2317	2317	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.939	0.300	0.204	0.911	0.325	0.311	0.674		0.949

Outcome: Individual Liberty/Rule of Law index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B6: Judicial Constraints (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	0.003 (0.002)	0.083*** (0.022)	0.065*** (0.022)	0.004 (0.004)	0.103*** (0.028)		0.017* (0.009)	0.028*** (0.010)	0.004** (0.002)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.090*** (0.033)			
Lagged Y	0.956*** (0.005)			0.936*** (0.010)			0.755*** (0.023)	0.911*** (0.036)	0.890*** (0.015)
Trend			0.000 (0.000)						
Corruption				-0.017* (0.010)	-0.548*** (0.119)				
Land Inequality Diffusion				-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)				
Internal Conflict				0.200 (0.250)	3.967 (2.513)				
External Conflict				0.002 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.014)				
Natural Resources				-0.003 (0.003)	-0.033* (0.017)				
Country FE				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)				
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11675	11770	11770	6800	6800	11217	2305	2305	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.917	0.137	0.0755	0.891	0.268	0.155	0.606		0.950

Outcome: Judicial Constraints index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B7: Legislative Constraints (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS	
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
GDPpc (ln)	0.003 (0.003)	0.056* (0.029)	0.025 (0.028)	0.006 (0.005)	0.100*** (0.037)			0.012 (0.012)	0.027** (0.011)	0.006* (0.003)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.083** (0.037)				
Lagged Y	0.950*** (0.004)			0.943*** (0.007)			0.748*** (0.020)	0.942*** (0.032)	0.807*** (0.019)	
Trend			0.002*** (0.001)							
Corruption				-0.026** (0.013)	-0.493*** (0.151)					
Land Inequality				-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)					
Diffusion				0.173 (0.313)	3.619 (3.267)					
Internal Conflict				0.001 (0.004)	0.007 (0.022)					
External Conflict				0.000 (0.003)	-0.029 (0.021)					
Natural Resources				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)					
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181	
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116	
<i>Obs</i>	10980	11093	11093	6721	6727	10806	2153	2153	18860	
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.923	0.227	0.139	0.903	0.275	0.264	0.657		0.893	

Outcome: Legislative Constraints index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B8: Free Expression (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	0.000 (0.002)	0.075*** (0.028)	0.037 (0.029)	0.002 (0.005)	0.161*** (0.042)		0.013 (0.012)	0.035*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.080* (0.042)			
Lagged Y	0.956*** (0.004)			0.944*** (0.006)			0.713*** (0.025)	0.807*** (0.043)	0.899*** (0.013)
Trend			0.002*** (0.001)						
Corruption				-0.005 (0.009)	-0.498*** (0.177)				
Land				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)				
Inequality				0.048 (0.321)	7.058** (3.325)				
Diffusion				0.001 (0.005)	-0.029 (0.019)				
Internal				-0.003 (0.004)	-0.057*** (0.020)				
Conflict				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.001)				
External									
Conflict									
Natural									
Resources									
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11710	11806	11806	6775	6776	11273	2312	2312	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.937	0.297	0.139	0.913	0.326	0.315	0.654		0.935

Outcome: Free Expression index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B9: Alternative Sources of Information (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS	
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
GDPpc (ln)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.016 (0.031)	-0.020 (0.032)	0.003 (0.005)	0.131*** (0.039)			-0.002 (0.012)	0.027** (0.011)	-0.000 (0.002)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.031 (0.047)				
Lagged Y	0.957*** (0.004)			0.944*** (0.006)			0.734*** (0.025)	0.806*** (0.049)	0.896*** (0.013)	
Trend			0.004*** (0.001)							
Corruption				0.004 (0.008)	-0.321* (0.166)					
Land Inequality				-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)					
Diffusion				0.279 (0.298)	7.110*** (2.629)					
Internal Conflict				0.003 (0.005)	0.006 (0.020)					
External Conflict				-0.002 (0.004)	-0.043** (0.021)					
Natural Resources				0.000 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.001)					
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156		181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22		116
<i>Obs</i>	11735	11830	11830	6800	6800	11277	2317	2317		18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.940	0.328	0.159	0.917	0.327	0.342	0.685			0.938

Outcome: Alternative Sources of Information index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B10: Free Association (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.038 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.030)	0.003 (0.005)	0.122*** (0.041)		0.005 (0.012)	0.028*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.002)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.038 (0.041)			
Lagged Y	0.960*** (0.004)			0.948*** (0.006)			0.699*** (0.027)	0.781*** (0.058)	0.902*** (0.013)
Trend			0.003*** (0.001)						
Corruption				0.002 (0.012)	-0.425*** (0.154)				
Land Inequality				-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)				
Diffusion				0.070 (0.330)	5.441* (3.217)				
Internal Conflict				0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.019)				
External Conflict				-0.004 (0.004)	-0.035* (0.020)				
Natural Resources				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)				
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11647	11743	11743	6800	6800	11195	2298	2298	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.944	0.332	0.151	0.923	0.339	0.366	0.655		0.940

Outcome: Free Association index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B11: Elected Officials (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	0.006 (0.006)	0.052 (0.038)	0.038 (0.036)	0.036** (0.015)	0.228*** (0.062)		0.004 (0.022)	0.042** (0.021)	-0.002 (0.004)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.026 (0.054)			
Lagged Y	0.848*** (0.008)			0.802*** (0.013)			0.484*** (0.028)	0.489*** (0.040)	0.837*** (0.009)
Trend			0.005*** (0.001)						
Corruption				0.008 (0.048)	-0.126 (0.208)				
Land				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)				
Inequality				0.223 (0.911)	1.427 (2.501)				
Diffusion				-0.024* (0.013)	-0.068** (0.032)				
Internal				-0.007 (0.009)	-0.061* (0.033)				
Conflict				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.002)				
External									
Conflict									
Natural									
Resources									
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11732	11827	11827	6800	6800	11277	2316	2316	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.780	0.202	0.183	0.686	0.115	0.220	0.390		0.863

Outcome: Executive Selection index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B12: Adult Suffrage (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.094*** (0.029)	-0.057** (0.028)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.071* (0.038)		-0.027** (0.011)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.011*** (0.003)
GDPpc (ln) L20						-0.085** (0.035)			
Lagged Y	0.920*** (0.005)			0.912*** (0.009)			0.651*** (0.018)	0.728*** (0.028)	0.872*** (0.012)
Trend			0.009*** (0.001)						
Corruption				-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.260*** (0.094)				
Land Inequality Diffusion				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)				
				0.112 (0.214)	1.515 (2.244)				
Internal Conflict				0.007* (0.004)	0.026 (0.020)				
External Conflict				0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.021)				
Natural Resources				0.000** (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)				
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	134	134	157	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11609	11706	11706	6789	6789	11190	2291	2291	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.942	0.574	0.519	0.945	0.625	0.615	0.771		0.932

Outcome: Mass Suffrage index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B13: Polity2 (Polity IV)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	0.002 (0.003)	0.071** (0.032)	0.021 (0.028)	0.009 (0.006)	0.098*** (0.037)		0.016 (0.014)	0.064*** (0.013)	0.015*** (0.004)
GDPpc (ln)						0.098** (0.039)			
L20									
Lagged Y	0.928*** (0.006)			0.893*** (0.010)			0.666*** (0.029)	0.663*** (0.050)	0.750*** (0.021)
Trend			0.003*** (0.001)						
Corruption									
Land				-0.024 (0.017)	-0.478*** (0.155)				
Inequality									
Diffusion				-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)				
Internal				0.097 (0.448)	5.447** (2.476)				
Conflict									
External				0.011** (0.005)	0.032 (0.022)				
Conflict									
Natural				-0.009 (0.006)	-0.028 (0.026)				
Resources									
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	155	155	155	135	135	156	154	154	216
<i>Years</i>	211	211	211	99	99	193	42	42	213
<i>Obs</i>	12676	12823	12823	6696	6716	11854	2465	2465	23445
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.912	0.354	0.275	0.845	0.265	0.355	0.655		0.828

Outcome: Polity2 index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B14: UDS (Pemstein)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	0.001 (0.002)	0.031* (0.016)	0.004 (0.015)	0.002 (0.004)	0.027 (0.022)		0.007 (0.009)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.011*** (0.003)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.024 (0.022)			
Lagged Y	0.891*** (0.009)			0.872*** (0.012)			0.552*** (0.039)	0.639*** (0.067)	0.590*** (0.020)
Trend			0.003*** (0.000)						
Corruption				-0.024** (0.011)	-0.267*** (0.087)				
Land Inequality				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)				
Diffusion				0.406 (0.367)	5.419** (2.709)				
Internal Conflict				0.000 (0.003)	-0.014 (0.010)				
External Conflict				-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.016)				
Natural Resources				-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)				
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	155	155	155	135	135	156	154	154	181
<i>Years</i>	65	66	66	53	53	67	12	12	116
<i>Obs</i>	8001	8150	8150	4999	4999	7663	1499	1499	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.864	0.294	0.231	0.828	0.286	0.327	0.545		0.806

Outcome: UDS index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B15: Political Rights (FH)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS	
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
GDPpc (ln)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.001 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.032)	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.052 (0.052)			-0.001 (0.023)	0.091*** (0.020)	0.027*** (0.005)
GDPpc (ln) L20						-0.024 (0.033)				
Lagged Y	0.854*** (0.013)			0.805*** (0.019)			0.439*** (0.042)	0.636*** (0.064)	0.567*** (0.018)	
Trend			0.007*** (0.001)							
Corruption				-0.042 (0.034)	-0.167 (0.176)					
Land				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)					
Inequality				0.431 (0.752)	1.381 (3.373)					
Diffusion										
Internal				-0.012 (0.008)	-0.065** (0.028)					
Conflict				0.002 (0.012)	0.029 (0.030)					
External				0.001*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.001)					
Conflict										
Natural										
Resources										
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<i>Countries</i>	155	155	155	135	135	156	154	154		181
<i>Years</i>	39	40	40	27	27	44	7	7		116
<i>Obs</i>	5521	5678	5678	3030	3030	6323	997	997		18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.784	0.146	0.134	0.703	0.145	0.150	0.304			0.713

Outcome: Political Rights index, inverted scale. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B16: Civil Liberties (FH)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.023 (0.027)	0.025 (0.026)	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.045)		0.010 (0.019)	0.056*** (0.015)	0.024*** (0.005)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.009 (0.027)			
Lagged Y	0.851*** (0.012)			0.795*** (0.017)			0.463*** (0.036)	0.656*** (0.045)	0.495*** (0.021)
Trend			0.006*** (0.001)						
Corruption				0.003 (0.023)	-0.047 (0.134)				
Land Inequality				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)				
Diffusion				0.375 (0.740)	4.848 (3.258)				
Internal Conflict				-0.007 (0.007)	-0.065*** (0.021)				
External Conflict				0.006 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.029)				
Natural Resources				0.001*** (0.000)	0.002* (0.001)				
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	155	155	155	135	135	156	154	154	181
<i>Years</i>	39	40	40	27	27	44	7	7	116
<i>Obs</i>	5521	5678	5678	3030	3030	6323	997	997	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.797	0.191	0.164	0.688	0.119	0.199	0.420		0.704

Outcome: Civil Liberties index, inverted scale. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B17: BMR (Boix et al.)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Logit	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
GDPpc (ln)	0.007 (0.005)	0.109*** (0.041)	0.084** (0.041)	0.013 (0.010)	0.143*** (0.055)		1.400*** (0.439)	0.040*** (0.009)
GDPpc (ln) L20						0.175*** (0.051)		
Lagged Y	0.904*** (0.007)			0.870*** (0.010)			2.268*** (0.219)	0.551*** (0.031)
Trend			0.003*** (0.001)					
Corruption				-0.066** (0.027)	-0.708*** (0.198)			
Land Inequality				-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)			
Diffusion				1.292* (0.748)	10.320** (4.753)			
Internal Conflict				0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.029)			
External Conflict				-0.006 (0.006)	-0.036 (0.032)			
Natural Resources				0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)			
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	155	76	216
<i>Years</i>	207	207	207	99	99	187	41	213
<i>Obs</i>	12232	12351	12351	6786	6788	11010	1550	23445
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.873	0.312	0.279	0.804	0.233	0.322		0.638

Outcome: BMR index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B18: Lexical (Skaaning)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
GDPpc (ln)	0.010** (0.005)	0.104*** (0.027)	0.064** (0.025)	0.017* (0.009)	0.132*** (0.038)			0.040** (0.017)	0.013*** (0.004)
GDPpc (ln)									
L20						0.079** (0.037)			
Lagged Y	0.849*** (0.010)			0.817*** (0.013)			0.479*** (0.037)	0.442*** (0.064)	0.731*** (0.016)
Trend			0.003*** (0.000)						
Corruption				-0.048 (0.030)	-0.460*** (0.165)				
Land				-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)				
Inequality				1.165* (0.661)	6.831** (2.961)				
Diffusion				0.006 (0.009)	-0.023 (0.028)				
Internal				-0.002 (0.007)	-0.018 (0.025)				
Conflict				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)				
External									
Conflict									
Natural									
Resources									
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	157	157	157	135	135	158	156	156	216
<i>Years</i>	211	211	211	99	99	193	42	42	213
<i>Obs</i>	12947	13081	13081	6734	6747	12053	2509	2509	23445
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.825	0.378	0.305	0.739	0.241	0.374	0.523		0.826

Outcome: Lexical index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B19: Electoral Contestation (V-Dem)

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Y>0	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GDPpc (ln)	0.005** (0.002)	0.089*** (0.022)	0.067*** (0.022)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.161*** (0.029)		0.004 (0.003)	0.022** (0.011)	0.071*** (0.017)	0.005** (0.002)
GDPpc (ln)						0.092*** (0.029)				
L20										
Lagged Y	0.912*** (0.008)			0.893*** (0.010)			0.959*** (0.006)	0.633*** (0.030)	0.695*** (0.055)	0.878*** (0.013)
Trend			0.003*** (0.000)							
Corruption				-0.056*** (0.016)	-0.580*** (0.120)					
Land				-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)					
Inequality				0.238 (0.530)	7.461* (3.992)					
Diffusion				-0.004 (0.004)	-0.017 (0.013)					
Internal				-0.003 (0.004)	-0.041** (0.018)					
Conflict				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.001)					
External										
Conflict										
Natural										
Resources										
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	156	156	156	135	135	157	149	156	156	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	111	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	11599	11699	11699	6800	6800	11190	7211	2287	2287	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.909	0.385	0.329	0.892	0.437	0.410	0.915	0.641		0.934

Outcome: Electoral Contestation index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *, **, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), Y>0 (scores for Electoral Contestation that surpass 0), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B20: Urbanization and Competitive Elections

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Logit	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Urbaniz	0.077*** (0.026)	0.711*** (0.202)	0.712*** (0.164)	0.030 (0.066)	0.210 (0.333)		1.424 (1.767)	0.197*** (0.051)
Urbaniz						0.648*** (0.218)		
L20								
Lagged Y	0.892*** (0.008)			0.845*** (0.012)			2.243*** (0.198)	0.578*** (0.031)
Trend			0.001*** (0.000)					
Corruption				-0.084** (0.034)	-0.701*** (0.207)			
Land				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)			
Inequality				2.010** (0.897)	10.318** (4.552)			
Diffusion				0.005 (0.010)	-0.030 (0.034)			
Internal				-0.007 (0.007)	-0.052 (0.034)			
Conflict				0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)			
External								
Conflict								
Natural								
Resources								
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	188	188	188	138	138	188	95	216
<i>Years</i>	211	211	211	99	99	193	42	213
<i>Obs</i>	16165	16357	16357	7137	7152	16161	2063	23445
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.850	0.288	0.253	0.765	0.203	0.282		0.668

Outcome: Competitive Elections index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), logit (conditional logit), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B21: Urbanization and Clean Elections

<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	GMM	OLS
<i>Sample</i>	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	5-year	5-year	MI
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Urbaniz	0.050*** (0.017)	0.369*** (0.132)	0.389*** (0.128)	0.081** (0.033)	0.377** (0.176)		0.224*** (0.063)	0.265*** (0.067)	0.059*** (0.019)
Urbaniz						0.375*** (0.134)			
L20									
Lagged Y	0.892*** (0.009)			0.834*** (0.015)			0.605*** (0.030)	0.564*** (0.054)	0.839*** (0.014)
Trend			0.003*** (0.001)						
Corruption				-0.126*** (0.025)	-0.724*** (0.136)				
Land				-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)				
Inequality				0.416 (0.556)	4.320 (2.983)				
Diffusion				-0.009 (0.006)	-0.025 (0.019)				
Internal				-0.005 (0.005)	-0.029* (0.016)				
Conflict				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)				
External									
Conflict									
Natural									
Resources									
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	164	164	164	138	138	164	164	164	181
<i>Years</i>	111	112	112	99	99	117	22	22	116
<i>Obs</i>	15555	15737	15737	7232	7232	16557	3043	3043	18860
<i>R2 (within)</i>	0.872	0.359	0.328	0.807	0.357	0.385	0.600		0.910

Outcome: Clean Elections index. *Estimators:* OLS (ordinary least squares), GMM (generalized method of moments), standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Sample:* Full (all available data), 5-year (data aggregated at 5-year intervals, after constructing 5-year moving averages), MI (missing data imputed with the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B22: Competitive Elections (logit models)

<i>Sample</i>	Full 1	Full 2	Full 3	Full 4	Full 5	5-year 6	Full 7
GDPpc (ln)	0.945*** (0.334)	1.749*** (0.463)	0.194 (0.383)	1.709*** (0.443)	2.724*** (0.669)	1.682*** (0.508)	
GDPpc (ln), L20							2.263*** (0.705)
Lagged Y	6.338*** (0.252)			6.033*** (0.362)		2.345*** (0.269)	
Trend			0.054*** (0.010)				
Corruption				-3.954*** (1.517)	-8.036*** (2.622)		
Land Inequality				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)		
Diffusion				110.314*** (39.201)	152.577** (62.081)		
Internal Conflict				0.415 (0.413)	-0.031 (0.425)		
External Conflict				-0.614 (0.494)	-0.912* (0.503)		
Natural Resources				0.029 (0.019)	-0.000 (0.041)		
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	86	87	89	60	60	78	82
<i>Years</i>	152	152	211	99	99	31	154
<i>Obs</i>	7351	7434	8831	3842	3848	1370	6910
R2 (<i>pseudo</i>)	0.827	0.519	0.502	0.800	0.530	0.562	0.529
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-839.2	-2363	-2857	-522.5	-1230	-396.6	-2198

Outcome: Competitive Elections index. Logistic regression, standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Units of analysis:* country-years, unless otherwise noted. Right-side variables measured at T-1.

Table B23: Dynamic Probit Models on binary measures (Electoral Regime/Competitive Elections)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Electoral Regime 1	Competitive Elections 2
GDPpc (ln) (Coefficient relevant for transition into ER/CE)	-0.078 (0.069)	0.162*** (0.059)
Lagged Y	0.273 (0.615)	1.510* (0.772)
GDPpc (ln)X Lagged Y	0.423*** (0.087)	0.349*** (0.102)
Estimated coeff. of GDPpc (ln) on “survival” of ER/CE	0.344*** (0.044)	0.511*** (0.071)
Country FE		
Year FE	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	111	211
<i>Years</i>	156	157
<i>Obs</i>	11792	12947
R2 (<i>pseudo</i>)	0.745	0.875
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-1702.74	-1067.32

Outcome: Competitive Elections index. Probit regression, standard errors clustered by country. *.1, **.05, ***.01 (two-sided tests). *Units of analysis:* country-years. Right-side variables measured at T-1.